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Richard Gale’s slender monograph is a sometimes insightful, sometimes enervat-
ing and always personal reckoning with John Dewey’s philosophy. Gale’s basic 
thesis is that Dewey is a unificationist malgré lui, that despite being committed to 
empiricism and pluralism his pragmatism remains profoundly metaphysical in a 
non-naturalistic sense. This claim is hardly new or surprising. Thinkers as diverse 
as George Santayana, Richard Rorty and John Patrick Diggins, to name but a few, 
have also noted traces of supernaturalism and monism throughout Dewey’s corpus. 
Moreover, recent works including Victor Kestenbaum’s The Grace and Severity of 
the Ideal (Chicago 2002), James Good’s A Search for Unity and Diversity (Lexington 
2005) and Melvin Rogers’ The Undiscovered Dewey (Columbia 2008) have addressed 
the intersection of Dewey’s writings with spiritual and religious themes. Gale de-
scribes his own contribution as “a mere footnote” (26n9) to Steven Rockefeller’s John 
Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism (Columbia 1992), an intellectual 
biography narrated in the long shadows of Dewey’s evangelical upbringing. Where 
Gale’s work stands out, however, is in its claim that Dewey’s corpus is incoherent 
unless significantly modified. As Gale sees it, Dewey’s work is shot through with a 
tension between his scientistic metaphilosophy and the “metaphysical” bases and 
aspirations for his theory of experience. On the one hand, Gale argues that Dewey 
denies qualitative experiences any cognitive value; on the other, he offers that Dew-
ey’s privileged process of inquiry rests on intersubjective communication about 
qualitatively “felt” and ultimately ineffable problematic situations in experience. As 
such, Dewey’s endorsement of scientific method is incompatible with his aesthetic 
conception of inquiry. Therefore, either his methodology or his metaphysics has to 
go. Gale recommends that Dewey drop his infatuation with science and own up to 
his identity as a traditional metaphysician. 
The work’s introduction explains Gale’s systematic approach to Dewey’s phi-
losophy and briefly lays out the general argument. Gale reads Dewey’s key con-
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cepts of inquiry, moral democracy, communication and education as forming a 
pyramid “with growth as the summum bonum at its apex” (11). In Gale’s words, 
growth “involves the realization by an individual of ever richer and more extensive 
unifications, both within herself and with other persons, as well as with her natu-
ral environment” (11). Below this apex comes inquiry, the controlled and directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into a unified, meaningful whole (12). 
Inquiries are successful if they lead to greater harmony within concrete experience. 
Gale writes that inquiry “involves the realization of greater esthetic unification” (12). 
Moral democracy comes next, for it “will empower citizens to freely bring about 
their own growth, and to do so it must create the circumstances in which they will 
become effective inquirers” (13). Communication undergirds moral democracy, for 
“[c]ollective inquiry requires a community of shared interests and purposes” which 
can only be gleaned through “widespread communication” (14). Finally, education 
sits at the pyramid’s base, teaching citizens “how to engage in collective inquiry” 
(15). While perhaps somewhat forced (an image of a cone or cylinder rather than a 
pyramid seems more apt), Gale’s pyramidal schematization, whether one accepts it 
or not, reveals that the systematic aspects of Dewey’s work can be easily overlooked 
if one does not make a conscious effort to illuminate them. This image, moreover, 
allows Gale to make his dramatic claim that “Dewey’s grand pyramid is a glorifica-
tion of humanity as a Promethean creator of meaning and value through the active 
control of nature by inquiry. . . . This one-idea fanaticism is both the glory and the 
misery of Dewey’s philosophy” (18). Cataloguing the errors of Deweyan inquiry is 
the task to which Gale applies himself in subsequent chapters. The rest of the book is 
structured in two parts composed of four chapters each. The first section, “Growth, 
Inquiry, and Unity,” develops the argument that Dewey is obsessed with unity. Gale 
scrutinizes his method of inquiry and tries to show how Dewey inappropriately ap-
plies it in all domains. The second section, “The Metaphysics of Unity,” concerns 
Dewey’s implicit worldview. Gale seeks to demonstrate that Dewey’s basic mysti-
cism is a shaky foundation for the ostensibly verificationist demands of inquiry. 
A constant theme throughout both sections of the book is that Dewey was a 
“Promethean mystic” (19) for whom human subjects alone can effectuate the uni-
fication Dewey desires. Though mentioned regularly, Gale does not directly argue 
for this claim. Despite the book title’s promise, Dewey’s Promethean quest for unity 
remains a background assumption throughout the work. While it would take more 
space than a review affords to trace all of Gale’s arguments, the thrust of his book’s 
first section is simple: inquiry in Dewey is not what it is claimed to be. Gale is skep-
tical of Dewey’s position that we are always already involved in inquiry, and accuses 
Dewey of employing an aesthetic model of collective problem-solving that makes 
the successful conduct of inquiry nearly impossible. Three reasons why inquiry is 
incoherent form the core of Gale’s first chapter (42): 1) Dewey diagnoses experiences 
as problematic and hence in need of inquiry-based solution based on the subjec-
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tive, qualitative feel of disequilibria, and yet inquiry is predicated on the possibil-
ity of intersubjective communication; 2) Dewey defines problematic situations as 
unique, and hence we can presume they are incommunicable for the same reason; 
and 3) Dewey’s determinate situation that concludes inquiry aims at an ambitious 
Hegelian synthesis that far outstrips the modest demands of resolving a particular 
indeterminate situation. The rest of Part I deepens these claims. The second chapter 
examines Dewey’s ostensibly Hegelian approach through an extended treatment of 
Art as Experience. The third chapter sheds doubt on inquiry’s ubiquity. The fourth 
is critical of Dewey’s intersubjective understanding of growth, which Gale holds 
“cannot make room for individuality and human creativity” (102). 
Obviously these are controversial claims. Gale’s economical mode of argumen-
tation and his weighty conclusions for future Dewey scholarship warrant detailed 
engagement. For present purposes, I begin with the observation that some readers 
will be sympathetic to the idea that (intersubjective) inquiry is not as ubiquitous as 
Dewey thought it was. Nevertheless, Gale’s reasons for this skepticism are uncon-
vincing. Consider his three foundational claims (noted above). First, is ineffability 
really a stumbling block in Dewey’s account in the way Gale imagines? Physical pain 
is an intimately personal feeling, and is thoroughly ineffable insofar as no descrip-
tion can enable another to feel my pain. And yet clearly we can communicate the 
fact of pain to another—for instance, to a doctor—and the listener can recommend 
courses of action for relieving the pain. Here Gale seems especially uncharitable in 
his reading of Dewey, for ineffability in Dewey’s sense of pre-discursive qualitative 
feels is hardly a barrier to inquiry. Neither is uniqueness. Every problematic situ-
ation is conceivably unique in the sense that the particular constellation of events 
and agents has not and will never occur again. Yet it is far from clear why this banal 
fact precludes meaningful problem-solving activity; at best, it suggests that there 
is no one-size-fits-all solution to diverse problematic situations. However, this is 
rather less than the complete breakdown of inquiry that Gale espies. To give an-
other example, musical notes are unique, but that hardly means that the same song 
played in two different recording sessions is unidentifiable. My tone-deaf experience 
of hearing “Sophisticated Lady” undoubtedly differs from my friend with perfect 
pitch’s experience. Yet it would be absurd to suggest that we would have no way of 
sensibly communicating our respective listenings to each other. As for the claim 
that Dewey has an unworkably “aesthetic” conception of knowing once a problem 
is solved, I must admit that I miss the force of Gale’s argument. For one, given the 
concerns voiced in this paragraph, it is hard to see why the fact that individuals 
ultimately judge the success of inquiry based on whether the solution feels right 
is corrosive to Dewey’s account. Gale appears to demand of Dewey precisely what 
Dewey rejects, namely an infallible and absolute conclusion to inquiry measurable 
by some autonomous and objective standard. Furthermore, Gale also contends that 
relating Dewey’s conception of inquiry to Hegel is a knock-down argument against 
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it. Leaving the question of Dewey’s residual Hegelianism aside—I am doubtful that 
the holistic aspirations Gale sees pulsing through Dewey’s later work is on the same 
plane (or planet) as Hegel’s totalizing cosmology—this criticism is only trenchant 
if Hegel is wrong, an assumption for which Gale never argues. 
The second part of the book turns from inquiry to Dewey’s metaphysics, focus-
ing on what Gale calls Dewey’s quest for “intellectual mysticism,” or his yearning 
for undifferentiated oneness with the universe. Each chapter takes up a different 
aspect of Dewey’s philosophy. In brief, chapter 5 details the tension between Dewey’s 
verificationist-empiricist metaphilosophy and his own questionably verifiable claims 
about experience’s “generic traits.” Chapter 6 argues that Dewey’s concept of time is 
too romantic to plausibly satisfy the hard-nosed needs of inquiry. Chapter 7 criticizes 
Dewey’s “Humpty Dumpty Intuition” that if philosophy begins with the assump-
tion that humans are distinct individuals, then the individualistic world it envisions 
cannot be made into a collective whole once again. Chapter 8, finally, argues that 
Dewey’s aversion to mysticism is rooted more in his aversion to the anti-democratic 
tendencies of traditional religions than in any coherent philosophical objections. 
As with the book’s first section, there are many complicated claims here that 
warrant careful scrutiny. However, I will only raise concerns about Gale’s treat-
ment of Dewey’s so-called “Humpty-Dumpty Intuition,” since the bulk of his ar-
gument rests on this account. Gale appears here to fall to the myth of the given, for 
the argument that the world is fundamentally comprised of discrete individuals is 
advanced simply because it could be so. Dewey would not deny this, for any claims 
he makes about numerical individuality or moments of felt oneness with the uni-
verse are fallible. Yet Dewey had good reasons for privileging ontological continu-
ity over separateness. Reconstructing individuals ecologically, according to their 
social-genetic context, enabled Dewey to address the meaningfulness of experience 
as filtered through our reconstructable habits of conduct. Dewey’s point is not that 
we cannot be seen to be separate, but that significance is always already embedded 
in a social structure of meaning. Starting from the whole rather from the individ-
ual allows Dewey to argue for the necessarily intersubjective and social aspects of 
meliorative reconstruction denied by atomistic philosophies.
Something must finally be said about Gale’s style. John Dewey’s Quest for Unity 
was originally a series of lectures, and the text’s amiable chattiness and rhetorical 
snubs might rub some readers the wrong way. From likening Dewey to a “Madison 
Avenue huckster” or the mustachioed “derelict” who once accosted him on a street 
corner (84, 134), to talk of hand jobs and the universe’s bowel movements (90, 171), 
Gale’s penchant for provocation and crude humor can detract from the serious-
ness of his endeavor. Occasionally Gale makes utterly bizarre claims, for instance, 
that Dewey’s writings have “a preachy quality, which would have been offensive 
were it not for the fact that they reeked of sincerity the like of which has never been 
matched, not even by Elvis Presley” (10). Finally, Gale could have chosen his ex-
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amples with greater care: I cannot make sense of his reference to El Cid’s Passion 
of Christ on the Cross (56)—the painter and painting simply do not appear to exist 
(perhaps Gale meant “El Greco”?).
In short, Gale is far from proving his case that Dewey was an intellectual mys-
tic constrained by a positivistic straightjacket. For all the defects in his arguments, 
however, I do not mean to denigrate the value of this entire work. Sympathetic writ-
ers rarely take Dewey to task to this extent. Thus, pragmatism scholars will find in 
Gale’s book a bounty of material to fruitfully argue with. It is to Gale’s credit, then, 
that he does not claim to have made an incontrovertible case. Rather, he writes that 
his interpretation is “an interesting and original one that has reasonable textual mo-
tivation, at least as good as any rival . . .” (164). Gale has thrown the gauntlet down, 
and other Dewey readers are invited to answer. 
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